Aiming at the problem that signcryption scheme of the conditional public key cryptosystems cannot resist the quantum attack, a new signcryption scheme based on multivariate public key cryptosystems was proposed. Combining the central map of multilayer structure in Multi-layer Matsumoto-Imai (MMI) with the CyclicRainbow signature scheme, and using the constructure of the central map in Hidden Field Equation (HFE), the signcryption scheme was designed by introducing an improved method of constructing central map. The analysis shows that, compared with the original MMI, the scheme's key size decreases by 5% and the ciphertext reduces by 50%, and it also makes encryption and signature both realizable at the same time. In the random oracle model, its indistinguishability under the hardness of Multivariate Quadratic (MQ) problem and its unforgeability under the Isomorphism of Polynomials (IP) assumption were proved respectively. And it shows that the proposed scheme has unforgeability under the adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack as well as indistinguishability under the adaptive chosen message attack.
The existing identity-based signcryption schemes are based on random oracle model. In order to solve its low security, a new identity-based efficient signcryption scheme was proposed in standard model. The proposed scheme was based on the difficult problems of discrete logarithm and factorization and could efficiently improve the security. And it is proved that the confidentiality relies on the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption and the unforgeablity relies on the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. In addition, the scheme has public verifiability. The comparison and analysis show that the proposed scheme is more efficient and has a wide application range compared with similar schemes.
At present, the safety analysis of SNAKE algorithm is mainly about interpolation attack and impossible differential attack. The paper evaluated the security of SNAKE(2) block cipher against integral attack. Based on the idea of higher-order integral attack, an 8-round distinguisher was designed. Using the distinguisher, integral attacks were made on 9/10 round SNAKE(2) block cipher. The attack results show that the 10-round SNAKE(2) block cipher is not immune to integral attack.